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AN ARCTIC PERIL: THE PITFALLS AND
POTENTIAL OF A FRAGMENTARY
POLAR LAW
INTRODUCTION
n May 28, 2008, representatives from Canada, Denmark,
Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States
convened in the remote ice-bound city of Ilullisat, Greenland to
issue a short, but decisive, statement regarding the future of in-
ternational law in the Arctic Circle.1 This was known as the Ilu-
lisat Declaration, and its basic tenet was that The United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),2 despite be-
ing unratified by the United States, was sufficient to govern the
Arctic Ocean.3 The <34: UBCC2SO the product of “the largest
and most compleS international negotiation ever heldO” codified
thousands of years of maritime custom and international rela-
tions.4 These nations decided at Illulisat that there is no need for
a polar-specific regime.5
The Arctic Circle begins sixty-six degrees north of the equator
and encompasses 4 percent of the Earth’s surface and <7 percent
1. See The Ilulisat Declaration, OCEANLAW.ORG (May 28, 2008),
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf. [herein-
after ILULISAT].
2. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
3. See ILULISAT, supra note 1. (“This framework provides a solid foundation
for responsible management by the five coastal States and other users of this
Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provi-
sions. We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international
legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean. We will keep abreast of the develop-
ments in the Arctic Ocean and continue to implement appropriate measures.”).
See also Satya N. Nandan, Panel I Introductory Remarks: Overview of Changes
in the Arctic Environment and the Law, in CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC
ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 15 (2010).
4. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 2.See also Peter Prows, Tough Love:
The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS Property Law (and What
Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 241 (2007).
5. ILULISAT, supra note 1. Hari Osofsky, Jessica Shadian & Sara
Fechtelkotter, Arctic Energy Cooperation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1431, 1448
(2016). See alsoMonique Andree Allain, Canada’s Claim to the Arctic: A Study
in Overlapping Claims to the Outer Continental Shelf, 42 J. MAR & COM. 1, 4
(2011).
O
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of its land.6 The region spans twenty-four time zones and twenty
million square kilometers.7 The Arctic Ocean, the smallest of the
world’s oceansO lies within and covers fourteen million s'uare
kilometers.8Much of the ocean was for the greater part of human
history completely inaccessible, but in the last three decades, as
a result of anthropogenic climate change, Arctic sea ice has lost
half its area and three quarters of its volume.9 In a process
known as the ice-albedo feedback loop, melting ice diminishes
the overall albedo (solar reflection) of the planet and further con-
tributes to global warming, especially amplifying the summer
ice retreat.10 The 2012 summer ice pack covered half the area it
did in 2000.11
The resulting rise in sea levels has threatened coastal popula-
tions from the South-Pacific to the American gulf coast, and
rapid changes in the Arctic ecosystem?shifting landscapes and
dwindling biodiversity?have severely disrupted the traditional
economy of the Inuit people, the largest of the three groups of
hyperborean indigenous peoples.12 Species native to the Arctic
face existential challenges. Polar bears, who live on drifting sea
ice during hunting season, contend with starvation as their
hunting ice disappears; Peary caribou have been unable to ac-
cess their tundra grasses through the crusty snow formed by
warming; and killer whales have been feeding on otters because
sea lions and seals have followed changing fish migrations out
6. Scott Borgeson, The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the Region
Heats Up, FOREIGN AFF. 76, 80 (2013), http://boulder-wadg.org/misc/TheCom-
ingArcticBoom.pdf.
7. Melissa Renee Pegna, U.S. Arctic Policy: The Need to Ratify a Modified
UNCLOS and Secure a Military Presence in the Arctic, 44 J. MAR. & COM. 169,
170 (2013).
8. David Balton, Ocean Governance in the High North, 139 PROCEEDINGS
MAG. 325, 325 (2013).
9. Borgeson, supra note 6, at 28. (“Climate change is redrawing the physi-
cal face of the Arctic.”).
10. Clara Deser et al., Arctic Sea Ice Variability in the Context of Recent At-
mospheric Circulation Trends, 13 J. CLIMATE 617, 617 (2000).
11. Osofsky et al., supra note 5, at 1431.
12. Sophie Theriault, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: Inuit People’s
Food Security in the Age of Climate Change and Arctic Melting, 15 SW. J. INT’L
L. 223, 224@26 (2009).
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of the whales’ habitat rangeK13 Climate change’s effect on Arctic
fisheries is far more difficult to predict.14 Thermohaline circula-
tion can vary immensely from season to season and year to year,
and fish populations are plugged into so many distinct ecosys-
tems that predicting the effect of warming on one cannot take
into account changes in the others.15 Whatever the case, Arctic
states stand to gain, at least in the short term, far more than
they can expect to lose. The Arctic Ocean now stands poised to
becomeO in the words of one eSpertO “an emerging epicenter of
industry and trade akin to the Mediterranean SeaK”16
Zespite its global relevanceO the Arctic’s future has been inL
creasingly dominated by the following five powerful coastal na-
tions: Norway, Sweden, Canada, the Russian Federation, and
the United States.17 The region’s thirty different indigenous
groups, representing over four million people, were ignored in
the drafting of the Ilullisat Declaration and remain disenfran-
chised in Arctic soft-power organizations.18 Nevertheless, the
coastal states have asserted that UNCLOS is sufficient to meet
the needs of the Arctic Circle, its people, economy, and environ-
ment.19 Paradoxically, despite insoluble disagreements and ri-
valries, the coastal states are determined to maintain the legal
status quo in the Arctic.20
This Note will analyze the legal infrastructure governing the
opening of the Northwest and Northeast shipping lanes in the
twenty-first century.21 It will argue that the current legal regime
13. David Vanderzwaag, Rob Huebert & Stacy Ferrara, The Arctic Environ-
mental Protection Strategy, Arctic Council and Multilateral Environmental In-
itiatives: Tinkering while the Arctic Marine Environment Totters, 30 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 141@43 (2001).
14. Jennifer Jeffers, Climate Change and the Arctic: Adapting to Changes
in Fisheries Stocks and Governance Regimes, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 917, 936 (2010).
15. Id.
16. Borgeson, supra note 6, at 28.
17. Albert Buixadé Farré et al., Commercial Arctic Shipping through the
Northeast Passage: Routes, Resources, Governance, Technology, and Infrastruc-
ture, 37 POLARGEOG. 298, 306 (2014).
18. Tessa Mendez, Thin Ice, Shifting Geopolitics: The Legal Implications of
Arctic Ice Melt, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 527, 543@44 (2010).
19. ILULISAT supra note 1.
20. Rob Huebert, Cooperation or Conflict in the Arctic?, in CHANGES IN THE
ARCTICENVIRONMENT AND THEUNITEDNATIONSCONVENTIONOF THELAWOF THE
SEA 28 (2010).
21. The Northwest Passage, which takes its name from the fabled prize of
early American explorers, refers loosely to shipping lanes running through the
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is insufficient to meet the environmental, economic, military,
and political challenges that the melting of the Arctic ice-cap
presents. Specifically, this Note will focus on the legal problems
attendant to the variously categorized maritime zones in the
Arctic Ocean and explore the advantages and disadvantages of
a patchwork system of institutions and laws. The current legal
infrastructure provides insufficient guidance on economic, terri-
torial, regulatory, and political dispute resolution. In response,
stake-holding countries must negotiate a multilateral treaty
amending the charter of the Arctic CouncilO the region’s main
international organization, to provide a more comprehensive
mandate to resolve these problems.
Part I of this Note will explore the growing commercial, politi-
cal, and strategic importance of the Arctic region and the poten-
tial for conflict such rapid climate change engenders. It will also
examine the natural resources, fossil fuels, fish, and minerals
that are drawing states to compete over Arctic access, while in-
troducing the nascent shipping routes that pit freedom of navi-
gation against national sovereignty. Part II will explain the
problems of the current legal regime governing the Arctic, in-
cluding the difficulty of determining which straits are interna-
tional and which are internal, where coastal continental shelf
ends and the Common Heritage of Mankind seabed begins, and
how aggressively a coastal state may regulate shipping that
passes through its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Finally, Part
III will lay out a treaty-based solution to the region’s myriad leL
gal shortcomings. The proposed treaty system would vest legis-
lative, adjudicative, and enforcement powers in newly inclusive
and globally accountable Arctic Council institutions.
I. ANOCEAN IN FLUX
This Part will describe the breakneck speed of the Arctic’s
changing commercial, political, and morphological reality. As
the waters warm, glaciers melt, and summers lengthen, Arctic
ecosystems are changing dramatically and threatening the live-
lihoods of many who depend on Arctic natural resources. This
Arctic waters North of Canada. Farré et al., supra note 17, at 299. The North-
east Passage is an even broader term for the shipping routes that run across
the Northern flank of Russia, connecting Europe and Asia through the Arctic.
Id. The term is used interchangeably with the Russian term, the Northern Sea
Route. Id.
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Part will describe the helter-skeleter dash to establish influence
in the cryospere. It will articulate why and how nations are rush-
ing to fill the power vacuum that melting sea ice has opened up
and introduce the territory at stake in the jurisdictional disputes
between coastal nations.
The promise of a seasonally ice-free Arctic within twenty years
has spurred hope in the Northwest and Northeast passages as
viable global shipping routes. 22 Despite inroads made by air and
ground transport, maritime shipping represents between 80 per-
cent and 90 percent of global trade.23 Much of this passes
through the Suez Canal, around the Cape of Good Hope, or
through the Panama Canal.24 This is unlikely to change anytime
soon. Neither the Northeast, nor Northwest passages, have
emerged as significant rivals to these routes.25 Several obstacles
remain. Ice patterns vary dramatically month tomonth and year
to yearO and since container ships operate on a “=ust-in-time” sysL
tem designed to maximize efficiency, unpredictability often
amounts to commercial unfeasibility.26
An ice-free Arctic, however, promises more predictable sched-
ules.27 Ships will no longer have to contend with unpredictable
ice floes. Meanwhile, the possibility of navigable shipping routes
has already stimulated investment in resource extraction within
the Arctic Circle.28 Ships plying the Northeast Passage, which
runs through the Novaya Zemlaya Sea, will cover 24 percent less
distance from Shanghai to Rotterdam than those which pass
through the Suez Canal.29 In the summer of 2013, the 19,000 ton
cargo vessel, the Yong Shen, shaved off 5,700 nautical miles, or
60 percent of its route, by using the Northeast Passage in transit
22. Colonel Todd L. Sharp, The Implications of Ice Melt on Arctic Security,
11 DEFENSE STUD. 297, 299 (2011). Theriault, supra note 12, at 224@26.
23. Sharp, supra note 22, at 298@300.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Farré et al., supra note 17, at 302. Tight financial margins require a




29. This passage is neither a single route nor a static concept. See Christo-
pher R. Rossi, Russian Arctic Straits and the Temptation of Uti Possidetis, 24
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 19@22 (2014). See also The Water Area
of the Northern Sea Route, NORTHERN SEA ROUTE ADMIN,
http://www.nsra.ru/ru/ofitsialnaya_informatsiya/granici_smp.html (Russ.).
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from Dalien to Rotterdam.30 The northern route saved $600,000
USD worth of fuel and avoided the risk of piracy that plagues
more southern seas.31 For now, Russian icebreaker support is
expensive and ice floes are unpredictable, but the economics of
the passage could change dramatically in the next two decades.32
A burgeoning marine tourism industry is already moving into
the Arctic, a development made ironic by the contributions
cruise-ships and air travel have made to the global warming that
is opening up previously inaccessible portions of the polar re-
gions.33
The intersection of developing nautical technologies withmelt-
ing ice sheets may also make transport of people and goods more
profitable.34 Hor eSampleO Samsung’s ARipod propeller mechaL
nism?a propeller capable of 360-degree rotation and an ice-
breaker prow attached to the “back” of a ship?can transform a
standard blue-water vessel into an icebreaker capable of break-
ing through 1.5 meters of ice.35 Maersk is currently constructing
seven ice-class container vessels to be built by COSCO Shipyard
Company in Zhousan, China, to trade in Northern Europe.36
Prior to such developments, commercial shipping vessels univer-
sally required ice-breaker escorts to travel safely in icy waters.37
Lifting this cost from shipping operations will greatly increase
the feasibility of trans-Arctic shipping.
The growth in Arctic shipping will also be spurred by direct
resource exploitation in the Arctic Ocean itself, which provides
a further incentive for coastal states to cultivate their territorial
30. Rossi, supra note 29, at 19.
31. Id. at 19@20.
32. Id. at 62@64.
33. Mary Edes, Ecotourism in the Arctic Circle: Regional Regulation is Nec-
essary to Prevent Concerned Environmentalists from Further Contributing to
Climate Change, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 251, 252@53
(2008).
34. Huebert, supra note 20, at 48.
35. Id.
36. Jeanne L. Amy, Historically Iced Out: Calling on the United States To
Resolve Its International Law Disputes in the Arctic Ocean, 40 TUL. MAR. L. J.
137, 155 (2017).
37. Huebert, supra note 20, at 48.
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claims over the Arctic.38 Indeed, the region presents an enor-
mous opportunity for hydrocarbon extraction.39 The U.S. Geolog-
ical Survey has estimated that the ocean may hold 13 percent of
the world’s undiscovered oil and 9I percent of its undiscovered
natural gas.40 Much of this will become extractible for the first
time as the ice sheets recede.41 Further, recent advances in ship-
design and extraction technology allow oil and gas companies to
access hydrocarbons where previously impossible.42 For coun-
tries deeply anxious about their energy independence, the Arctic
represents a promise of energy security well into the twenty-first
century.43
Less spoken of, but perhaps just as promising, heavy metal
mining has a promising future across the world’s oceansK44 Tech-
nological breakthroughs, specifically in the field of hydraulic
mining systems, are allowing companies to access minerals
thousands of meters below the surface.45Mining companies have
been laying claim to various sites thought to be promising in
polymetallic nodules, valuable ores of manganese, iron hydrox-
ides, and diamonds.46 Even the cold itself may be a promising
resource, for it offers ample cooling potential for servers and dig-
ital storage centers that typically require expensive HVAC in-
frastructure. Facebook, for instance, recently opened a data stor-
age center in northern Sweden.47
The most prized resources of the Arctic, however, are those
that have been exploited for the longest amount of time. Arctic
fisheries represent some of the most promising resources in the
38. Vanderzwaag et al., supra note 13, at 300.
39. Id.
40. Sharp, supra note 22, at 297.
41. Pegna, supra note 7, at 170.
42. Brian Spielman, An Evaluation of Russia’s Impending Claim for Conti-
nental Shelf Expansion: Why Rule 5 Will Shelve Russia’s Submission, 23
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 309, 341@48 (2009).
43. Id.
44. INT’L SEABED AUTHORITY, POLYMETALLIC NODULES,
https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG7.pdf.
45. See generally S.A. Schulte, Vertical Transport Methods for Deep Sea
Mining (June 19, 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Delft University of Technol-
ogy Section of Dredging Engineering), https://repository.tudelft.nl/is-
landora/object/uuid:86da5533-5a17-4c06-b725-
1022794f0d84/datastream/OBJ/download.
46. Huebert, supra note 20, at 29.
47. Borgeson, supra note 6, at 81@82.
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world.48 The Arctic has always been a rich source of cod, pollock,
salmon, squid, crab, and shrimp.49 Recently, however, as global
ocean temperatures have increased, fish populations have begun
migrating even further north.50 Lucrative fisheries are behind
the U.S.-Canadian dispute over a 6,000 square-mile wedge of the
Beaufort Sea.51A similar fish-fueled conflict has kept Russia and
Norway at loggerheads over the waters of the Svalbard Is-
lands.52 Shipping, fossil fuels, mining, tourism fishing, and even
the climate itself, all represent jewels in the Arctic crown over
which its coastal nations now vie.
The Arctic, in short, has gone from a no man’s land to a promL
ising frontier.53 As economic opportunities have drawn political
and strategic focuses north, long frozen border disputes have be-
gun to thaw.54 All eight coastal Arctic nations firmly insist on
weak circumpolar institutions, blurry maritime boundaries,
promising resource bases, and developing nautical technology.55
All of these nations, however, provide an alarming backdrop for
what may be the initial stages of an Arctic military build-up.56
The Russian Federation has commissioned eight new ballistic
missile nuclear submarines and continues to build large nuclear
icebreakers.57 In 2008, it resumed naval patrols in disputed seas
north of Borway to “protect Russian fishermen in the areaK”58
Norway has equipped five new frigates with the top-of-the-line
Aegis class aerial defense and its newest frigate carries a Bofor
57-mm cannon.59Denmark has recently finished four ice-capable
frigates of the Thetis class with anti-air and anti-submarine ca-
pabilities, and its ice-capable patrol vessels of the Knud
Rammsen series are designed to quickly accept 76-mm main
guns, Sparrow missile launchers and anti-submarine torpedo
48. Daud Hassan, Climate Change and the Current Regimes of Arctic Fish-
eries Resources, 40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 511, 513@14 (2009).
49. In addition, scallops, sablefish, perch, halibut, sole, atka, flatfish, and
turbot can also be found in these waters. Id.
50. Pegna, supra note 7, at 171.
51. Sharp, supra note 22, at 307.
52. Id. at 308.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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tubes.60 Rather than develop their navies, Sweden and Finland
have deepened their ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization, permitting major exercises on their territory.61 Canada
has also taken Arctic security very seriously, employing a veri-
table fleet of icebreakers, frigates, and offshore patrol vessels,
along with a training base for Canadian Rangers in Resolute,
Canada, and 24-hour satellite coverage of the Canadian high
north (Radarsat II).62 Ironically, only the United States, with
four aging and sometimes out-of-commission icebreakers, has
opted not to build up its ice-capable fleet, to the dismay of some
military commentators.63 The Admiral of the U.S. Coast Guard,
Paul Zukunft, warned of the Russian presence in the Arctic:
They’ve made a strategic statement and they’ve got all their
chess pieces on the board right nowK K K K Right now we’ve got
maybe a pawn and maybe a rook. . . . If you look at this Arctic
game of chess if you willO they’ve got us at checkmateK64
As one military analyst cautions, however, this does not make
the Arctic a “Fobbesian free-for-all with dangerous potential for
conflictK”65 Rather, parties have demonstrated a remarkable
willingness to bind their claims to international law.66 Political
goodwill, transparent cooperation between state agencies, ac-
ceptance of shared science-based outlooks on the region, and in-
ternational institutions all militate towards peaceful dispute
resolution.67 Rapprochement and diplomacy, rather than unilat-
eral seizure, have characterized Arctic border disputes.68
UNCLOS, for its part, provides a flexible battery of dispute res-
olution mechanisms?a “compleS third party settlement sys-
temO” which includes the International Tribunal on the Caw of
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Huebert, supra note 20, at 40@50.
63. Rossi, supra note 29, at 24.
64. Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, On Amer-
ica’s Arctic Frontline (May 3, 2017), https://www.csis.org/events/americas-arc-
tic-frontline-conversation-admiral-paul-f-zukunft-commandant-us-coast-
guard.
65. Sharp, supra note 22, at 308.
66. Id.
67. Huebert, supra note 20, at 29@33.
68. Sharp, supra note 22, at 308.
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the Sea, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and special ar-
bitration before technical experts.69 Such institutions have thus
far managed to head off any more explicit confrontations over
disputed maritime rights.70 Nevertheless, the draw of new re-
sources and shipping opportunities has put immense stress on
existing legal instruments to peaceably resolve attendant con-
flicts.
II. FAILURES OF THE CURRENT LEGALORDER
While a complicated web of legal arrangements is beginning to
envelop the Arctic Circle, much in the cryosphere remains
largely uncovered by law.71 This Part will describe the limita-
tions of UNCLOS when it comes to adjudicating disputes in the
Arctic Ocean. Specifically, this Part will focus on the ambiguity
attendant to international conceptions of internal waters, terri-
torial seas, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf exten-
sionsO and administratively special “froRen watersK” This compliL
cated and motley patchwork of legal categories fails to ade-
quately provide for conflict resolution or environmental protec-
tion.
A. Questions of Sovereignty: Internal Waters and Territorial
Seas
The prevailing international law of internal waters and terri-
torial seas gives insufficient guidance on which shipping lanes
fall within or without coastal states’ sovereigntyO as well as what
the right of innocent passage72 through those waterways en-
tails.73 Internal waters can be delimited by straight baselines,
which are boundary marker lines between defined points of ref-
erence in accordance with UNCLOS Article 7.74 According to Ar-
ticle 7, a non-archipelagic state can only draw straight baselines
past its coastal low-tide marker “in localities where the coastline
69. John Noyes, Judicial and Arbitral Proceedings and the Outer Limits of
the Continental Shelf, VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1211, 1214@15 (2009).
70. Huebert, supra note 20, at 29@33.
71. Anna Maria Thoren, “Article 234, UNCLOS and the Polar Code,” 42@44
https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/42108/5071.pdf.
72. Passage is considered innocent or not according to UNCLOS Article 19,
which excludes from the category of innocent passage such activities as the use
of force, serious pollution, and fishing. Id. at 9.
73. Huebert, supra note 20, at 29@33
74. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 7.
2017] Fragmentary Polar Law 201
is deeply indented and cut into” or “if there is a fringe of islands
along the coast in its immediate vicinityK”75 An exception is made
for archipelagic states in UNCLOS Article 50, which provides
that an archipelagic state may draw straight baselines around
its outermost islands, such that waters inside those baselines
are internal waters.76 Internal waters are important because,
unlike territorial seas, they carry no right of innocent passage.77
States are free to deny other states navigation rights in their
internal waters.78
Drawing straight baselines around islands has been conten-
tious in the Arctic well before UNCLOS.79 In 1951, the ICJ de-
cided, in the Fisheries Case,80 that drawing baselines around is-
lands was permissible under certain local conditions, but that
such an act must be in accordance with international law, not
merely a municipal act.81 The ICJ reasoned that the
Skjaergaard, a fjorded region surrounding island formations on
the coast of Norway, was?by its jagged and erratic nature and
traditional association with Norway?more suitably understood
as internal waters of Norway than coastal waters.82 The ICJ ref-
erenced both the “peculiar geography” of the Borwegian coast
and England’s own tacit acceptance of Borwegian sovereigntyK83
It remains to be seen, however, whether Russia and Canada
have such compelling cases based on the peculiar geography of
their own northern coasts, or whether the practice of other
coastal states has effectively ceded them control.
Despite the narrow conditions for drawing straight baselines
under UNCLOS, both Canada and the Russian Federation have
75. Id. art. 6
76. Id. art. 50.
77. FRANCIS NGANTCHA, THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE
EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 26@27 (1990).
78. Id. at 26@29.
79. Id. at 27@30.
80. At stake in this case was where the boundary between Norway’s terri-
torial waters ended and high seas began, or, how close to Norway’s coast Brit-
ish vessels could fish. See Fisheries (U.K. v. Norway), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J.
Rep. 116, 126@28 (Dec. 18) [hereinafter Fisheries Case].
81. NGANTCHA, supra note 77, at 26@31. See also Fisheries Case, supra note
80, at 132 (“Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a
unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the
validity of the delimitation with regards to other States depends upon interna-
tional law.”).
82. Fisheries Case, supra note 80, at 132.
83. Id. at 139.
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drawn straight baselines that cut through significant portions of
the Northwest and Northeast Passages.84 These claims may be
without merit, however, for UNCLOS Article 46 defines an ar-
chipelagic state as one “constituted wholly by one or more archiL
pelagosK”85 According to a U.S. ambassador tasked with design-
ing UNCLOS, it would be unfeasible to recognize a Canadian
right to archipelago status without recognizing that of other
mainland coastal nations like Greece, or even the United States
(for Hawaii and the Aleautian Islands).86 Nevertheless, both
states have maintained these claims based on what commenta-
tors have interpreted as historic title.87 The ICJ, in the Fisheries
Case, recogniRes “waters which are treated as internal waters
but which would not have that character were it not for the ex-
istence of a historic titleK”88 The Norwegian Skjaergaard falls
into such a category.89 Historic possession of territory, possessio
longi temporis, may also be territorialized under the Roman pri-
vate law formulation, uti possedetis, ita possideatisO orO “as you
possessO so may you possessK”90 Canada has demonstrated that
it is willing to withdraw from the ICJ, as it did after ratifying
Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Zones in 1970 in order to pro-
tect its historical title over northern archipelagic waters.91 In
1985, before ratifying UNCLOS, the Russian Federation (then
USSR) codified in its domestic law its claim over its northern
waters as internal waters and drew straight baselines across
much of its northern archipelagic waters.92 Specifically, it
claimed historic title over the following several “chokepoints”
through which all transit must currently pass: the Vilkitsky and
84. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTICMARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT 51
(2009), http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/detect/docu-
ments/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf [hereinafter AMSA].
85. John Norton Moore,The UNCLOS Negotiations on Ice-Covered Areas, in
CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 23 (2010).
86. Id. at 24.
87. See DONAT PHARAND, CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
106@23 (1998).
88. Fisheries Case, supra note 80, at 130.
89. Id.
90. Rossi, supra note 29, at 50.
91. Canada was unclear on the legal foundation of its domestic legislation
and decided it was safer to withdraw from ICJ jurisdiction, rather than risk an
adverse judgment that could have far-reaching implications for its regulatory
regime past its territorial seas. SeeMoore, supra note 85, at 20.
92. PHARAND, supra note 87, at 152@53; see also Amy, supra note 36, at 145.
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Shokalsky Straits, the Dmitry Laptev and Sannikov Straits, and
the Proliv Long Strait.93
There are powerful cultural, political, and historical reasons
for both nations to take such stances.94 Canada has always seen
itself as a northern nation, and its Arctic character is a vital
component of its national identity.95 Several times during the
late twentieth century when U.S. vessels have crossed too close
to the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, such as the USS Manhat-
tan’s icebreaker mission in <363O Canadian citiRens and media
have reacted with patriotic indignation.96 Russia, for its part,
has also taken great pride in its northern character, as over a
million of its citizens and 20 percent of its GDP are located above
the Arctic Circle.97
The United States and European Union have formally regis-
tered their disagreement with Canadian and Russian claims of
internal waters over the Northwest and Northeast passages.98
As these passages become increasingly accessible, shipping com-
panies and flag states will be unclear whether their commerce
in the Arctic exists by right of innocent passage or at the leisure
of either the Canadian or Russian states.99 This disagreement
has the potential to be a flashpoint for greater conflict between
the world’s northern thalassocraciesK100 Less dangerous, but
more inevitable, is that the difficulty in establishing the con-
tours of states’ internal waters will make it impossible to deterL
mine any of the other maritime zones operative beyond it.101 The
internal seas provide the starting point for the twelve nautical
miles of territorial seas pursuant to UNCLOS Article 3, and from
there, the 200 nautical miles of EEZ pursuant to Article 57.102
93. Rossi, supra note 29, at 31.
94. Id. at 28; PHARAND, supra note 87, at 120@24.
95. PHARAND, supra note 87, at 152@53.
96. See Amy, supra note 36, at 142@44. See also Rossi, supra note 29, at 19@
20.
97. Rossi, supra note 29, at 26.
98. Thoren, supra note 71, at 31.
99. Id. at 26.
100. Rossi, supra note 29, at 33.
101. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 3, 57.
102. Id.
204 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 43:1
Internal and territorial waters overlap at the following five
junctions in the Arctic region: Norway-Russia, Canada-Den-
mark, Canada-U.S., Denmark-Russia, and Canada-Russia.103 At
the heart of all these disputes is a question of whether modern
international law or more ancient bilateral treaties or historical
titles should govern maritime jurisdiction. For instance, Norway
and Russia disagree over whether the Spitsbergen Treaty of
1920, which provides Norway with administrative and fishing
rights over the Svalbard Islands, should allow Norway to meas-
ure its EEZ from the shores of the Svalbard Islands.104 Russia
also seeks to use the sector line to divide waters off of the Sval-
bard Islands, whereas Norway would prefer the sector line, put-
ting 175,000 square kilometers of prime fisheries in dispute.105
Even stalwart allies like Canada and the United States have
found themselves disagreeing over possession of lucrative fish-
ing grounds.106 The Beaufort Sea dispute turns on dueling inter-
pretations of the 1825 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which reads,
“the said meridian line of <8<deg W in its prolongation as far as
the HroRen 2ceanK”107 Canada construes the 141st meridian to
define the boundary as continuing into the Arctic Ocean, based
on context and purpose of the treaty, whereas the U.S. construes
it as until the shores of that Ocean, at which point the Equidis-
tance Rule would apply.108 As a result, a large swathe of the
Beaufort Sea is contested and both countries endure a fishing
moratorium.109
Territorial waters are probably the oldest form of maritime
zone.110 The idea of a mare clausum doctrine has existed since
Roman times, falling in and out of fashion with mercantilistic
interests in free trade and fear of pirates.111 The concept was
eventually crystallized in the rule of Dutch jurist Cornelius van
Bynkershoek: Potestatem terrae finiri, ubi finitur armorum vis,
which translates asO “a country’s territorial sea eStends as far as
103. Brian J. Van Pay, National Maritime Claims in the Arctic, in CHANGES
IN THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 71 (2010).
104. Id. at 67.
105. Id. at 71.
106. Amy, supra note 36, at 152@53.
107. Id. at 147@48.
108. Van Pay, supra note 103, at 75.
109. Id.
110. NGANTCHA, supra note 77, at 15.
111. Id. at 116@17.
2017] Fragmentary Polar Law 205
the shot of a cannonK”112 This was eventually considered three
nautical miles.113 By 1956, the International Law Commission
would write in a report to the General Assembly of the United
Nations that the extension of territorial seas between three and
twelve miles had become state practice.114 Eventually, UNCLOS
codified a twelve nautical mile territorial sea and a twelve nau-
tical mile contiguous zone beyond that, making an altogether
twenty-four nautical mile zone of control.
This concept of territory, however, has undergone much legal
dispute.115 Territorial seas have endured a push and pull be-
tween being considered, in Grotius’ dichotomyO dominium, over
which states exercise ownership, and imperium, over which
states only have jurisdiction connected with piracy and prize-
making.116 This contest has been written into UNCLOS, which
allows sovereignty over a state’s territorial seas, but carves out
a significant exception for innocent passage, and an even more
glaring exception for innocent passage through an international
strait.117 CurrentlyO a state’s territorial watersO which begin seaL
ward off its coastline or straight baselines, must remain open to
the innocent passage of ships flying other states’ flagsK118 This
right, however, extends only to civilian surface transport.119 Mil-
itary uses of the strait, overflight, and submarine transit are all
forbidden without the consent of the coastal state.120 Even this
accomodation to coastal sovereignty, however, is restricted
where the strait through which ships pass is an international
strait between high seas.121 International straits also allow un-
fettered aircraft overflight, and, in no event, can the right of in-
nocent passage be suspended.122 Much therefore depends on
whether the Northwest and Northeast shipping routes are to be
112. Id. at 15@16.
113. Id. at 16.
114. Id. at 16.
115. Olya Gayazova, China’s Rights in the Marine Arctic, 28 INT’L J. MARINE
&COASTAL L. 61, 67 (2013).
116. NGANTCHA, supra note 77, at 16@26.
117. Id. See also HUGO CAMINOS & VINCENT P. COGLIANTI-BANTZ, THE LEGAL
REGIME OF STRAITS 227 (2014).
118. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 54.
119. NGANTCHA, supra note 77, at 16@26.
120. Thoren, supra note 71, at 9.
121. NGANTCHA, supra note 77, at 16@26.
122. Thoren, supra note 71, at 26@27.
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considered international straits.123 The United States and Euro-
pean Union both contend that the varying routes through the
19,000-island Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and the equally
sprawling Russian Northern Sea Route, are international straits
between two high seas124within themeaning of UNCLOS Article
37, affording other states the rights of uninterrupted passage,
submarine and aircraft carrier use, and unconsented-to military
transit.125
UNCLOS Article 37 may or may not require Canada and Rus-
sia to temper their claims of sovereignty over their northern ter-
ritorial waters.126 Certain scholars have argued that given the
functional difficulty of traversing the Northern Sea Route, the
designation of international strait may be inappropriate.127
2ther commentators have agreed that a “certain level of actual
use” was necessary for the designationK128 Dicta in the English
translation of the Corfu Channel Case, which turned on, inter
alia, whether Albania had a right to mine a portion of water off
of its own coastO suggest that the passageway’s geographical sitL
uation between two high seas is more important than use,
whereas the equally authoritative French translation gives
equal weight to use and geography.129 This is important, for due
to Soviet and then Russian rules of mandatory ice-breaker escort
and pilotage, the Northern Sea Route may almost never have
been freely used.130 In 1976, the United States commissioned two
Coast Guard icebreakers, Edisto and East Wind, to circumnavi-
gate the Arctic Ocean by sailing through the Russian North Sea
123. Id.
124. High seas, for their own part, are global commons. UNCLOS, supra note
2, art. 87.
125. Rossi, supra note 29, at 19@20. See also UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 37.
126. Id. at 19@25.
127. Id. at 41.
128. Id. at 43.
129. Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4,
28 (Apr. 9) (“[T]he decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation as con-
necting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for interna-
tional navigation.”). The use of the singular noun “criterion” suggests that the
geographical character of the strait is paramount. See also DONALDROTHWELL
&TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 209 (2016).
130. Rossi, supra note 29, at 43. Two certain exceptions are the journey of the
Vega, piloted by the Finnish-Swedish explorer, Adolf Erik Nordenskjold in
1878@79, and the Maud, captained by the Norwegian Roald Amundsen in
1918@19. Id.
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Route.131 They were, however, denied permission to enter the
Vilkitsky Strait, which ended their circumnavigation. Although
the U.S. protested vigorously, the success of Russian power-pro-
jection over its Northern Sea Route has suggested that the Rus-
sian Federation has successfully annexed the sea route as per a
sort of uti posseditis, or right by possession.132 Indeed, only the
United States has registered its objection to Russian claims of
sovereignty.133
Further, now that UNCLOS Article 234 licenses a coastal state
to take certain police powers over shipping in its EEZ, it is un-
clear how the requirement that ships in transit use highly ex-
pensive Russian pilots and icebreaker escorts squares with the
rights of innocent passage through international straits.134 One
researcher, William Dunlop, studied forty-three straits in the
Russian Arctic and concluded that all fit the criteria of straits
used for international navigation under UNCLOS Article 37.135
He concluded, however, that Russia had effectively nationalized
the entire passage-way, protests notwithstanding, and that
ships regularly queue for Russian permission before entering
any of the straits, out of both respect for Russian authority and
the need for ice-breaker and pilotage services.136 The unan-
swered question is whether, once the ice-melt reduces the need
for ice-breaker escorts, the Russian Federation can still require
transit fees from passing ships, or whether the Article 37 law of
international straits connecting two high seas will fully apply.137
Similarly, Canada vehemently disputes that its archipelagic
seas constitute an international strait connecting two high
seas.138 Canada’s dispute has focused on historical versus preL
sent use of the strait.139 Canada maintains that custom defines
the UBCC2S term “strait used for international navigation”140
as a “strait historically used for international navigationO” as opL
131. Id. at 37@43.
132. Id. at 37@43.
133. Id. at 65@67.
134. Id. at 45.
135. Id. at 42@46.
136. Id. at 45.
137. Rossi, supra note 29, at 56.
138. Moore, supra note 85, at 17@26.
139. Id.
140. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 34.
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posed to a “strait capable of being used for international navigaL
tionK”141Diplomatic dust-ups between the two countries have pit-
ted the American interest in guaranteeing unfettered commer-
cial navigation against the Canadian interest in safeguarding its
northern heritage.142
B. Questions of Regulation: Environmental Protection
The Arctic is protected by mainstream and side-stream re-
gimes, with the mainstream regime being the polar-wide regu-
lations promulgated by the Arctic Council, and the side-stream
being the efforts individual countries have made to protect their
northern shores under UNCLOS Article 234.143 Article 234?
granting regulatory prerogatives within that state’s EEX?and
the Arctic Council?an international organization with a man-
date to protect the region?do not, however, provide adequate
legal mechanisms to protect the Arctic environment or its indig-
enous peoples, many of whom struggle not only with climate
change but also with the depletion of local fisheries, dispossesion
of historical territories, criminalization of traditional hunting
methods, and pollution of their water, food, and soil.144 While
this Part will focus on the regulatory deficiencies of both
UNCLOS Article 234 and the Arctic Council, it is necessary to
first outline two of the gravest non-climate-change related
threats to the Arctic.
First, Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) provide a unique
danger to Arctic communities and their environment.145 POPs
travel north by long range atmospheric transport and accumu-
late around the pole.146 They are also brought by drifting ice and
migratory birds flying north in the summer who succumb to Arc-
tic predators.147 Pesticides148 and industrial by-products become
141. Moore, supra note 85, at 23.
142. Id.
143. See generally KAMRULHOSSEIN, Governance of Arctic Ocean Marine Re-
sources, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ONOCEAN ANDCOASTAL LAW (2015).
144. Huebert, supra note 20, at 28@29.
145. See Theriault, supra note 12, at 224@26 (detailing the well-known effects
of pollution on Inuit food security).
146. Id.; Vanderzwaag et al., supra note 13, at 131@32.
147. Id.
148. Vanderzwaag et al., supra note 13, at 134. Pesticides include dieldrin,
DDT, toxaphene, chlordane, and lindane. Id. Industrial compounds include
polychlorinated biphenyls, hexachlorobenzene, and short-chained chlorinated
paraffins. Id.
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buried in permafrost and exposed during melts or biomagnified
immediately in the food chain.149 The sparse and skeletal food
chains in the far north make concentrations of POPs in animal
fat especially deleterious to their predators, including hu-
mans.150 POPs are a problem of such global magnitude that they
can hardly be confronted by the governments of individual
coastal states. The Arctic Council has stepped in and organized
research as part of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strat-
egy.151 For instance, the Draft Stockholm Convention on Persis-
tent Organic Pollutants was finalized on December 10, 2000 and
adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Stockholm, Swe-
den on May 22@23, 2001.152 Nevertheless, Arctic organizations
have yet to develop a strategy to remove the region’s eSisting
POPs.153
Second, oil spills pose a formidable threat to the region.154 En-
ergy companies have been clamoring to develop the Arctic. Hill-
corp LLC is exploring the Beaufort Sea; Eni Norge AS is nearing
production at Goliat Field in the Barents Sea; and Gazprom is
moving ahead in the Pechora Sea.155 Yet, state approval does not
necessarily guarantee a company’s presence in the ArcticK Even
after receiving a green light to drill in the Chukchi Sea in 2015,
following almost a decade of litigation,156 Shell Oil found itself
unable to adequately enforce credible safety standards near its
drill sites. The corporation was simply not equal to the nautical,
logistical, and engineering challenges such a feat would re-
quire.157
An oil spill in the Arctic Ocean could be devastating.158 Unpre-
dictable ice floes in the Arctic region present a special danger to
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oil tankers. For instance, in 2008, the Brazilian tanker, Endless
Sea, became trapped in ice and began to leak in the Antarctic
Sea.159 Eventually, the ship sank and although the crew was res-
cued unharmed, 2,100 gallons of oil poured into the sea.160 In
cases such as these, containment crews must often wait until
temperate seasons to assess the damage.161 Even then, response
times are substantially slower than those in more temperate
climes.162 TheZepartment of Interior derided Shell’s planned reL
sponse time estimates as “unrealistic” and complained of “Shell’s
lack of rigorous and direct contractor oversight for a complex
first-of-its-kind pro=ectK”163 Dispersants are typically ineffective
in such an environment in any case.164 Compounding the danger
of a spill, high north ecosystems, due to their tightly interwoven
food chains, are uniquely vulnerable to massive disruption.165 A
spill on the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon, which dumped 4.9
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, would be cata-
strophic.166
Heightening this risk is the fact that regulation is exceedingly
difficult in the high north. Regulatory agencies are commonly
“captured” by industry interestsO whom regulatory agencies rely
upon for personnel and technical expertise.167 Agencies find it
impossible to set adequate benchmarks without corporate coop-
eration, and this asymmetry of power often tips the scales in fa-
vor of industry.168 Perhaps for this reason, disaster management
159. Elizabeth Burleson & Jennifer Huang, Governance of Climate Change
Impacts on the Antarctic Marine Environment, in CLIMATECHANGE IMPACTS ON
OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 315, 328
(Randall S. Abate ed., 2015).
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plans can be exceedingly optimistic. For instance, the U.S. Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 mandated an oil spill response plan de-
signed for a thirty day spill, but the Deepwater Horizon spill was
not sealed until almost five months after the explosion.169 Disas-
ters such as Deepwater and Horizon and Exxon Valdez, while
costly to clean, are also quickly forgotten by the public, as de-
mand for natural gas and oil are inelastic and ecological disas-
ters are often opaque and remote.170Behavioral biases also cause
planners to underestimate the likelihood of major spills, as so-
called “fat-tail”?or “black swan”?events are exceedingly un-
likely and exceedingly destructive.171 Planners, however, tend to
focus on the former quality to the exclusion of the latter.172 Rus-
sia’s environmental framework is even more laSO which should
worry all coastal nations, for spills obey neither borders nor offi-
cial diktat.173 A large spill would be devastating to the entire re-
gion, as the current regulatory regime is not up to the challenge
of preventing or responding to one. It is the task of both national
and supranational regulatory regimes to take on this challenge.
1. The National Regime: Article 234
UNCLOS has struggled to provide practical, fair, and feasible
oversight to the Arctic shipping lanes.174 Article 234 has gov-
erned the Arctic States’ stewardship of their emerging shipping
lanes since 1982.175 Diplomat John Moore helped craft UNCLOS
Article 234 in reaction to Canadian fears of untrammeled com-
merce in its northern backyard. Recognizing that the authority
Canada required over Arctic waters could not be given to other
nations under UNCLOS without severing throttling commercial
freedom, Moore offered to Canada, in his summary:
169. Id. at 775.
170. Id. at 802@17.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See generally Maria Ivanova, Oil Spill Emergency Preparedness in the
Russian Arctic: A Study of the Murmansk Region, POLAR RES. (2011),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3402/polar.v30i0.7285?needAc-
cess=true.
174. See generally HOSSEIN, supra note 143.
175. Aldo Chircop, International Arctic Shipping: Towards Strategic Scaling-
Up of Marine Protection, in CHANGES IN THEARCTICENV’T ANDLAW OF THE SEA,
177, 181@85 (2010).
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The ability in ice-covered areas, an extraordinary ability which
we’ve opposed for every other nation in the world in every other
setting, to let you set ship construction and operation stand-
ards for vessels not entitled to sovereign immunity: that is, ob-
viously not for warships, and not for coastguard vessels, etc.
This is provided in addition that the reasonableness of your
regulations is also subject to third party dispute regulation.176
To that end, UNCLOS Article 234 has been an effective tool in
the hands of Russian and Canadian lawmakers. Its foundations,
however, are not without flaws. Article 234 provides a powerful
but tenuousmechanism for Arctic countries to regulate economic
activity off their northern coasts.177 The Article reads:
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discrim-
inatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and
control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas
within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where partic-
ularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice cover-
ing such areas for most of the year create obstructions or ex-
ceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine
environment could cause major harm to or irreversible disturb-
ance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall
have due regard to navigation and the protection and preser-
vation of the marine environment based on the best available
scientific evidence.178
At its most basic levelO the article “authoriRes coastal states to
develop and administer special regulations for human activities
in ice-covered watersK”179 Scholars have debated, however, how
broadly the article should be read. More specifically, scholars
have questioned whether regulations permissible under the Ar-
ticle in a coastal nation’s EEX can be more stringent than those
allowable in their territorial passage, and whether the right of
innocent passage must also be upheld.180 Canada and Russia
have both relied on the Article for marine pollution controls and
176. Moore, supra note 85, at 21.
177. Chircop, supra note 175, at 182@83.
178. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 234.
179. Burleson & Huang, supra note 159, at 332.
180. Thoren, supra note 71, at 23@27.
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more.181 They, and other coastal nations, have drastically ex-
panded the customary interpretation of the Article in the last
decade.182
UNCLOS Article 234 responds to the Arctic 2cean’s uni'ue
need for resource management rules, which is sharpened by rel-
atively recent knowledge of the ocean’s fragilityK183 The exact
contours of this rule regime, however, are far from clear. 184
While Article :98 clearly grants regulatory powers over “iced-
covered areasO” interpretations differ on how muchO and for how
many months out of the year, ice must cover the sea for the Ar-
ticle to apply.185 The ending phrase of the Article, “with due reL
gard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the
marine envrionmentO” is clearly meant to weight competing
goals, but it provides textual support for both wide and narrow
interpretations of the Article.186 The Russian Federation has
used the Article to exercise near complete control over ships
passing through the Northeast Passage, requiring expensive ice-
breaker escorts.187 The Russian Northern Sea Route is still only
sparingly used by global shipping companies. In the event of in-
creased useO howeverO the Article’s ambiguity could prove to be
a point of contention between the Russian Federation and advo-
cates of free navigation on the high seas, such as the United
States.188
Indeed, the U.S. position on Article 234 has been one of ambi-
guity and contradictions. The U.S. has held, for instance, that
an Arctic state has no right under the Article to deny ships pas-
sage through one’s EEXO territorial seaO or international straitO
even if a non-state vessel is noncompliant with the coastal state’s
environmental regulations. Such a position is not only anoma-
lous among the Arctic states, but would also functionally evis-
cerate Article 234, leaving coastal states with only the ability to
181. Stanley P. Fields, Article 234 of UNCLOS: The Overlooked Linchpin for
Achieving Safety and Security in the U.S. Arctic? 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 55, 108
(2016).
182. Id.
183. Mendez, supra note 18, at 543@44.
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retroactively impose sanctions after environmental damages oc-
cur.189 The U.S. needs to find a way to balance its full-throated
support of free navigation with competing environmental and
political concerns.
ii. The Supranational Regime: The Arctic Council
As a regional locus of administrative power, albeit soft power,
the Arctic Council has been remarkably effective in fostering sci-
entific research in the Arctic, leading many to be optimistic
about its future.190 Nevertheless, there are powerful reasons to
believe that it will not suffice to protect Arctic ecosystems from
the influx of cruise ships, oil rigs, container vessels, and deep sea
barges poised to crowd the North Pole in the coming decades.191
The Arctic Council evolved from the precursor Arctic Environ-
mental Protection Strategy and was formally established on
September 19, 1996.192 While coastal states have made signifi-
cant efforts to coordinate reaching environmental and safety ob-
jectives, these efforts have failed to create a coordinated regula-
tory universe.193
Not everyone takes such a critical viewpoint. Some argue that
a fragmentary piecemeal system that functions should be pre-
ferred over a comprehensive treaty system that does not.194 In-
deed, the Arctic Council has made great inroads providing a co-
ordinated response network to oil spills, shipwrecks, and other
maritime perils. For instance, eight coastal Arctic states signed
the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue in the Arctic in May of 2011 to coordinate
coast guard responses and then two years later the Agreement
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
sponse in the Arctic to dictate minimum levels of pre-positioned
oil spill remediation equipment.195 Further, the Emergency Pre-
vention, Preparedness and Response Working Group has pub-
lished various reports, guidelines, and maps concerning hydro-
carbon extraction and shipping.196 Finally, the Arctic Regional
189. Fields, supra note 181, at 74.
190. See generally HOSSEIN, supra note 143.
191. Chircop, supra note 175, at 182@85.
192. Thoren, supra note 71, at 17.
193. Huebert, supra note 20, at 40@44.
194. HOSSEIN, supra note 143, at 294.
195. Vanderzwaag et al., supra note 13, at 303@06.
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Hydrographic Commission?established in 2010?surveys the
Arctic to modern standards.197 Thus far, only 10 percent of the
region has been adequately charted.198
Despite these scientific advancements, the Arctic Council still
has a long way to go. Ships sailing in the high seas of the Arctic
are still permitted to discharge oil and oily mixture because, alt-
hough the 65th session of the Marine Environmental Protection
Committee reached an “agreement in principle” regarding a ban
on such discharge, the United States demanded exemptions for
ships weighing less than 400 gross tons and the Russian Feder-
ation was against the ban, given limited port facilities on its
northern coast.199 Food waste discharge and grey water dis-
charge are also permitted, albeit with limitations, which is a reg-
ulatory failing that could quickly become a serious problem, as
melting ice brings tourist cruises closer to the North Pole. The
average cruise ship generates 3.8 million liters of grey water per
week.200 Black carbon discharge regulations have also been sty-
mied because of a difficulty in reaching a consensus.201 A ban on
heavy fuel is a political non-starter as well, despite the well-doc-
umented ecological ramifications of its use.202 Indeed, the Arctic
Council has struggled to even identify areas of heightened eco-
logical importance and sensitivity.203 These problems are not in-
soluble, as the Arctic Council may be the best institutional op-
tion for providing an environmental regulatory regime for the
Arctic high seas.204
The Arctic Council also has an important role to play in man-
aging coordinated safety efforts between Arctic coast guards.
The increasing numbers of ships traversing the Arctic, for trade
and tourism alike, create unique challenges of nautical safety.
205 In the winter, when ice blocks the sea lanes, ships can be
weeks away from rescue.206 Not only can hulls be crushed be-
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tween ice floes or dashed against icebergs, but they can also ac-
cumulate frozen water that comes off the surface in the form of
sea spray, which in great enough quantities can induce capsiz-
ing.207 Visibility is often limited, and the extreme cold can
quickly turn deadly.208 Search and rescue infrastructure is ex-
pensive to commission and maintain, but will be indispensable
in providing for safe navigation in the high seas of the Arctic.
The Arctic Council, as this Note will argue in Part III, must be-
come more inclusive and more effective to coordinate coast
guards’ shipwreck and oil spill responses.
C. Questions of Extraction: Continental Shelf Demarcation
Cooperation on the Arctic 2cean’s surface may mask competiL
tion on its seabed, however, UNCLOS provides insufficient tech-
nical guidance for Arctic states making claims to extended con-
tinental shelf. The regime for allocating underwater territory is
relatively young. In 1945, Harry Truman decreed that the re-
sources beneath the U.S. continental shelf belonged to the
United States.209 Thirteen years later, at the first UNCLOS, a
crude definition of continental shelf was codified to allow the ex-
traction of off-shore resources.210 The mechanism for determin-
ing where a coastal state’s continental shelf ends and the ComL
mon Heritage of Mankind seabed begins is, however, anything
but simple. The juridical concept of a continental margin encom-
passes the continental shelf, the continental slope, and the con-
tinental rise. A country has exclusive rights to the seabed re-
sources?hydrocarbons and minerals?of its continental land-
mass until such point where the landmass blends into the abys-
sal plains of the ocean floor.211 The waters above, however, are
considered high seas.212
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Empowered by UNCLOS Article 76 as a technical board, the
Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf (CLCS), com-
prised of a panel of 21 scientists, is tasked with determining
where a country’s continental shelf ends and where the open
ocean begins.213 A nation has a ten-year window from ratifying
UNCLOS to submit claims to the CLCS.214 Submission of such a
claim is a “costly and compleS processK”215 A claimmust establish
the existence of a natural prolongation of the continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles.216 The idea of a natural prolongation
of territory came from the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in
1969.217 Prolongations are typically determined by morphologi-
cal analyses. Where there is a morphological break between the
shelf and the prolongation, however, geological arguments can
be used to establish prolongation as well, as supported by ICJ
rulings in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case and the
Libya/Malta Continental Shelf Case.218 Both of these cases saw
the ICJ reach geomorphology-based compromises to resolve a
dispute over the same natural prolongation by using equitable
principles and the shelf’s physical characteristicsK219Advances in
deep-sea imaging technology have enabled countries to put a
greater emphasis on geological analysis.220
Once a prolongation is established, a claim must identify the
foot of the continental slope in order to determine the maximum
extensions of the continental shelf.221 The foot of the slope is de-
213. Id. at 24. For a definition of the term “continental shelf” see UNCLOS,
supra note 2, art. 76(1) (“The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the base-
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”).
214. Spielman, supra note 42, at 314@16.
215. Allain, supra note 5, at 11@14.
216. Id.
217. Id. See generallyNorth Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Repub. Ger. v. Den.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 20).
218. Allain, supra note 5 at 15@16. See generally Continental Shelf (Tunis. v.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. Rep 18, ¶ 60@62 (Feb. 24).
See also Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985
I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 40 (June 3).
219. Allain, supra note 5, at 15@16.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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termined by finding a series of evenly spaced bathymetric pro-
files perpendicular to the continental slope and deducing the
point of maximum depth change from them.222 This is made dif-
ficult in the Arctic Ocean by ice and sediment, both of which
make the determination of the point of maximum gradient
change difficult.223
From the foot of the slope, the outer limits of the continental
margin can be determined. There are two permissible means to
draw this line. The first is the Irish Formula, which draws the
outer limit where the thickness of the sediment is at least 1 per-
cent the distance to the foot of the slope.224 The Hedberg For-
mula, on the other hand, draws a line connecting points not more
than sixty meters from the foot of the slope.225 The former is
more problematic.226 The Irish Formula requires many measure-
ments of sediment depth, which test the accuracy of the most
advanced seismic measurement technology.227 Because both
methods may be used in tandem to maSimiRe a country’s
claim,228 the variability inevitable from any use of the Irish For-
mula is likely to inject controversy into any claim of valuable
territory.229
The fourth and final step in a continental shelf claim involves
applying a second constraint on shelf expansion. In no case may
a continental shelf “eSceed 97I nautical miles from the baselines
fromwhich the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath,
which is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metresK”230 The first
test is relatively straightforward, but the second test, of the
:O7II metre isobathsO is much more challengingO as “it necessiL
tates the measurement of absolute water depths with the utmost
222. Id.
223. Id. at 15@16.
224. Persand, supra note 210.
225. Allain, supra note 5, at 15@16.
226. Id.
227. Id. Researchers have identified the following several problems with de-
termining sediment thickness: 1) insufficient seismic profile coverage, 2) poor
seismic resolution, 3) the use of the velocity function in depth conversion, 4)
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accuracyK”231 This isobath, along with standards that are more
stringent for “ridgesO” as opposed to “elevationsO” are proving
particularly problematic in assessing Arctic claims.232
The Arctic is unique because it has the most continental shelf
by percentage of the world’s seven oceansK233 The trouble is de-
termining what this legally means, as the juridical concept of
continental shelf ignores differences in geological features be-
tween different types of continental margins, forcing a set of
complicated and evolving scientific designations into one mono-
lithic legal designation.234 In the early years of the new millen-
nium, several Arctic coastal nations have scrambled to put in
claims with the CLCS.235 Denmark has claimed the North
Pole.236 Norway, meanwhile, filed a more modest claim, which
was granted, awarding it part of the Banana Hole, the Loop
Hole, and a small area north of Svalbard.237 Canada is gathering
data to file for an extended continental shelf claim as well.238 The
United States is barred from filing a claim until it ratifies
UNCLOS, but its claim could potentially be so far-reaching in
scope as to overlap with other nations’ claimsK239 The most am-
bitious of these claims, however, has been that of the Russian
Federation.240
On August 2, 2007, a Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker
cleaved through ten feet of ice and released two deep-water sub-
mersibles, Mir-I and Mir-II.241 The submersibles descended to
4,300 meters, and while one collected soil samples, the other
planted a one-meter high titanium Russian tricolor.242 The expe-
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Van Pay, supra note 103, at 61@62.
234. Allain, supra note 5, at 18@19.
235. Id. at 61@62.
236. Id. at 77.
237. Id. at 65.
238. Id. at 76.
239. Id. at 61@62.
240. Allain, supra note 5, at 11@14.
241. Atle Staalesen, Russia Submits Claim for the North Pole, BARENTS
OBSERVER (Aug. 4, 2015), http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2015/08/russia-
submits-claim-north-pole-04-08. See also Tom Parfitt, Russia Plants Flag on
the North Pole Seabed, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2007), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic.
242. Id.
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dition’s leaderO Artur ChillingarovO left no doubt that the objec-
tive was to prove that “the Arctic is RussianK”243 The Canadian
Foreign Minister, Peter MacKay, retorted in calculated exasper-
ation thatO “WtVhis isn’t the fifteenth century% you can’t go around
the world planting flags and declaring 0WwVe’re claiming this terL
ritoryK”244 Former UNCLOSU.S. diplomat JohnMoore, however,
criticized the western response as overblown and needlessly hos-
tile to Russian expeditionary efforts.245 He drew a parallel to the
World War II flight of Jospeh Fletcher from Alaska to the North
PoleO where Hletcher lit fires under the plane’s engines to take
off in the subzero weather and was later called to Moscow to be
awarded a medal for his flight.246
Nevertheless, arguing that the Lomonosov Ridge and the Al-
pha Mendeleeyev Ridge are the “submerged prolongations” of
the Russian landmass, the Russian Federation has since laid
claim to a large swathe of the Arctic Circle.247 Minister MacKay
was likely correct in suggesting that the 2007 Russian flag-
planting was a legally meaningless “showO”248 but the soil and
rock samples collected from the undersea Lomonsov Ridge are
proving to be of great consequence to continental shelf claims in
the Arctic.249 The United States has argued against this claim
on the grounds that the two ridges, which run through the North
Pole, constitute free standing oceanic features not tied to any
continental shelf.250
These disputes will not soon resolve themselves, for the terms
contemplated by UNCLOS are necessarily legally terms,
whereas the proof they demand is scientific.251 Land mass, con-
tinental margin, and oceanic ridges, for instance, are geomor-
phological concepts open to scientific disagreement.252 Land ter-
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Moore, supra note 85, at 17@18.
246. Id.
247. Farré et al., supra note 17, at 311.
248. Parfitt, supra note 241.
249. Farré et al., supra note 17, at 311.
250. Vladimir Jares, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: The
Work of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Arctic,
42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1265, 1287 (2009).
251. Spielman, supra note 42, at 316@17.
252. Jares, supra note 250, at 1272.
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ritory and continental shelf, however, are legal terms demand-
ing hard and fast definitions.253 Article 76 seeks to employ the
latter to define the former, defining the continental margin as
“the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal
State, and consists of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf, the
slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with
its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereofK”254
The United States brought several geomorphological objec-
tions to the Russian claims.255 First, Article 76 provides that a
2,500 meter isobath is a definitive backstop on any continental
shelf claim: excluding natural prolongations, no continental
shelf can extend within 100 nautical miles of the 2,500 meter
isobath.256 The U.S. report argued that the Russian claims must
necessarily diverge in their assumptions from the data supplied
by the Intergovernmental Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic
Ocean.257 Second, the U.S. report avered that oceanic ridges, in-
cluding the Alpha-Mendeleeyev and Lomonsov ridges, are geo-
logically distinct from continental shelves and could thus not be
considered a natural prolongation of the Russian landmass.258
The United States further contended that the Alpha-Mendelee-
yev ridge is formed by hot spot vulcanism and thus not a “natuL
ral prolongation” of the Russian national landmassK”259 Third,
focusing on the geology of the ridges, the United States con-
tended that the rocks present on the ridge are nonspecific to the
Russian shelf and thus cannot be considered a geomorphological
extension of the continent.260
These geomorphological arguments are problematic. Not only
are scientific and legal standards of certainty set side-to-side in
an uneasy embrace, but also the CLCS does not answer the am-
biguity presented in Article 76 as to the differences, vel non, be-
253. Id.
254. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 76(3).
255. Spielman, supra note 42, at 329@40.
256. Jares, supra note 250, at 1275.
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tween ridges, oceanic ridges, and submarine ridges as to the for-
mation of natural prolongations.261 The CLS also does not pro-
vide an adequate definition of oceanic ridge, suggesting that in
some cases “Wthe term oceanic ridgeV clearly refers to 0oceanic
spreading ridges’ onlyO while in others it seems to apply to all
ridges composed of oceanic basaltic rocksK”262 The CLCS does not
eSactly clarify the standard when it provides that its “view shall
be based on such scientific and legal considerations as natural
prolongation of land territory and land mass, morphology of
ridges and their relation to the continental margin . . ., and con-
tinuity of ridgesO” and the CCCS notes finally that ridges be eSL
amined on “a case-by-case basisK”263 Such flexible administrative
interpretation of an already ambiguous Article 76 provides little
in the way of predictabilityO especially given that coastal states’
submissions to the CLCS are confidential. For example, a strict
formulation of 0oceanic ridges’ would limit the term to oceanic
spreading ridges, which would likely result in a CLCS holding
for Russia’s claim on the Alpha Mendeleeyev ridge, as the oppos-
ing U.S. claim suggests that the ridge was formed by a hot
spot.264 A broader interpretation of oceanic ridges, which in-
cludes hot spots, might encompass the Alpha Mendeleeyev ridge
under the American theory, and would therefore defeat the Rus-
sian claim.265
This is a poor mechanism to allocate Arctic resources, as it
promises a haphazard and adversarial division of the seabed.266
It risks divvying up the Arctic in favor of those countries with
the resources and access to make claims.267 The collection of
bathymetric data required for these claims is time-consuming
261. Id. See also Comm’n on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Scientific
and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf adopted at its Fifth Session, CLCS/11, at § 7.2 (May 13, 1999),
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/documents/Guide-
lines/CLCS_11.htm#7.2.%20Oceanic [hereinafter CLCS Guidelines].
262. Id. See also Spielman, supra note 42, at 329@40.
263. CLCS Guidelines, supra note 261.
264. Spielman, supra note 42, at 329@40.
265. Id.
266. Brent Carpenter, Warm is the New Cold: Global Warming, Oil,
UNCLOS Article 76, and How an Arctic Treaty Might Stop a New Cold War,
39 ENVTL. L. 215, 243@46 (2009).
267. Id.
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and prohibitively expensive.268 Because the CLCS rules allow
this data to remain confidential, other states cannot vet their
rivals’ dataO leaving them unsure as to how other submissions
may interact with their own.269 Although bathymetric cartog-
raphy, the mapping of the various depths of ocean floor, has
come a long way since Fridjof Nansen first used lead lines to
measure ocean depth between 1893 and 1896, even multi-beam
echo sounding faces technical challenges in the Arctic.270 The
transducer array must be in direct contact from the water and is
thus vulnerable to both ice debris and the sonic interference in
its echo reception caused by icebreaking.271
The inherent potential of conflict in continental shelf demar-
cation would be worrisome by itself, but, as the U.S.-Canadian
dispute over the Beaufort Sea has demonstrated, the relation-
ships of friendly nations can usually survive even a pressing ter-
ritorial dispute.272 When combined with other sources of conflict,
however, the territorial dispute can become a dangerous trip-
line.273 Russian-American relations, overcast even in the sunni-
est weather, have taken on a progressively stormy aspect in the
last decade.274 Technical challenges aside, the adversarial na-
ture of the Continental Shelf demarcation process, as well as the
geographical singularity of the Arctic Ocean, risk closing off the
Arctic from the rest of the world?a process of territorializing
that could create a mare clausum which would “certainly lay
bare pieties regarding the future role of the Common Heritage
of Mankind principle in international lawK”275
III. A TREATY BASED SOLUTION TO THE ARCTIC’S LEGAL
DEFICIENCIES
This Part argues that the Arctic’s legal lacunae will best be
filled by a far-reaching multi-lateral treaty addressing political,
268. This being said, there have been exciting breakthroughs in bathymetric
technologies over the last few decades. See generally Larry Mayer, Sea Floor
Mapping and Exploration in a Changing Arctic Sea Ice Environment, in
CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 91 (2010).
269. Jares, supra note 250, at 1302.
270. Id.
271. Mayer, supra note 268, at 90,
272. Rossi, supra note 29, at 29.
273. Id. at 31.
274. Farré et al., supra note 17, at 311.
275. Rossi, supra note 29, at 57.
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environmental, and commercial disagreements. It will advocate
that nations with an interest in the Arctic?all members of the
Arctic Council, including indigenous groups and observer
states?negotiate and sign a treaty, or set of treaties, codifying
the regulatory and territorial rules governing the region, espe-
cially the prevailing interpretations of UNCLOS as applied to
the high North. A comparison of the current Arctic legal regime
with the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) will demonstrates the
potential of such a treaty. Ultimately, however, the Arctic is
unique, and coastal nations will not consent to such an untouch-
able res communis so close to their Northern borders. Rather
than calling for new institutions, this Part will instead advocate
for strengthening the Arctic Council and, through multilateral
treaty law, transforming the Arctic Council from a soft-power
body to a robust and independent body with binding legislative,
adjudicative, and enforcement functions. There is no doubt that
the Arctic Council must be changed dramatically in order to act
as the forum of such a treaty-making process and engage in the
substantive rule-making needed.
A. A Multilateral Treaty Investing Legislative Power in the
Arctic Council
The ATS is an excellent model of polar governance.276 Signed
by seven states on December 1, 1959, the treaty did not resolve,
but only froze, existing disputes and territorial claims.277 The
ATS mandated that the Antarctic region remain demilitarized
and unexploited, while listing the region under special annexes
pertaining to stricter restrictions of oil, noxious liquid sub-
stances, and garbage, none of which include the Arctic Ocean.278
Such a parallel polar treaty would diminish risks of both
armed conflict and further ecological degradation around the
North Pole. There are, however, many obstacles preventing the
formation of a comprehensive treaty system capable of crafting
such binding regulations.279 Foremost among them are questions
of coastal nations’ sovereigntyO structural governanceO and indigL
enous peoples’ autonomyK280 Although the ATS could serve as a
276. Burleson & Huang, supra note 159, at 316@20, 329.
277. Id. at 320.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 336@39.
280. Id. at 336@39, 342.
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valuable model for treaty law in the region, ultimately, a com-
prehensive Arctic Treaty must stand on its own merits and per-
mit the levels of economic development that stakeholder nations
will require.281
The Arctic Council, restricted by mandate and consensus to
the role of a soft-power institution, could serve as a platform for
the gradual development of such a system.282 The Arctic Council,
if it is to be useful, needs to be reformatted in both its member-
ship and its mandate.283 Real development of a permanent envi-
ronmental and political solution to the Arctic quandary must en-
tail a multilateral treaty modifying the Arctic Council.284
Such a treaty should aspire to the ATS in both scope and mem-
bership, if not substance.285 As a threshold issue, the hegemony
of the Arctic Five must give way to a global stewardship of the
planet’s northern poleK286 Second, politically sensitive geograph-
ical demarcations, especially the borders between continental
shelfs and the designations of international straits, must be
agreed upon by international consensus or frozen until such a
point of agreement is politically feasible.287 International custom
regarding the interpretation of Article 234 must be clarified,
and, where possible, strengthened by treaty.288 The Arctic needs
a robust set of environmental regulations that do not depend
upon political uncertainties for their existence or enforcement.
B. Greater Inclusion of the Arctic Council
An Arctic treaty must involve as signatories all affected par-
ties, especially non-Arctic trading powers such as the People’s
Republic of China and IndiaK The Arctic Council’s membership
and voting structure should thus be amended to constitute a
more representative chorus of Arctic stakeholders, which in the
twenty-first century, includes all coastal nations.289 All trading
nations, not only the Arctic Five, stand to gain or lose from the
281. Molly Watson, An Arctic Treaty: A Solution to the International Dispute
over the Polar Region, 14 OCEAN&COASTAL L.J. 307, 328 (2008).
282. Burleson & Huang, supra note 159, at 315.
283. Id.
284. Watson, supra note 281, at 330.
285. Id. at 328.
286. Id. at 329@30.
287. Id. at 329@30.
288. Id. at 318.
289. Burleson & Huang, supra note 159, at 342.
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melting of the Arctic ice caps over the course of the next few dec-
ades.290 Indeed, in May 2013, when the Arctic Council voted at
the Kiruna Ministerial meeting to grant permanent observer
status to China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Italy, and In-
dia, the Danish Foreign Minister observed that the move “reL
flects the fact that many countries outside the Arctic area also
have legitimate interests in the development of the regionK”291
The People’s Republic of ChinaO for instanceO has been positionL
ing themselves as a near-Arctic state.292 Its dependence on hy-
drocarbons and its export-based economy require increased ac-
cess to fossil fuels and decreased shipping costs.293 The nature of
reciprocity in international law likewise ties questions of mari-
time policy in Chinese territorial seas and EEZ to those in the
Arctic Circle.294
The authority and power of the Arctic Council has grown dra-
matically in the previous decade.295 Currently there are twelve
observer nations, all of whom are shipping powers in their own
right, and who are currently denied speaking privileges in the
Arctic Council.296 This has a deleterious effect on multilateral
decision-makingK Bot only is the “cross-pollination of ideas” stiL
fled by constraining discourse to the opinions of the eight Arctic
Council member states,297 but the Arctic Council also risks in-
centivizing excluded parties to seek alternative avenues of
power projection.298 Arctic Council members should no longer
pretend that they are the only ones affected by changes in the
Arctic, for barring equally affected non-coastal states from deci-
sion-making processes only denigrates the Arctic Council’s legitL
imacy.299 The melting of the Arctic icefields is a global problem
290. Id. at 342.
291. Shiloh Rainwater, International Law and the ‘Globalization of the Arc-
tic’: Assessing the Rights of Non-Arctic States in the High North, 30 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 115, 116 (2015).
292. Fields, supra note 181, at 108.
293. Sharp, supra note 22, at 311.
294. Olya Gayazova, China’s Rights in the Marine Arctic, 28 INT’L J. MAR. &
COASTAL L. 61, 63@74 (2013).
295. See generally HOSSEIN, supra note 143, at 18.
296. Burleson & Huang, supra note 159, at 339.
297. The Arctic Eight are the Arctic Five plus Finland, Iceland and Sweden.
Allain, supra note 5, at 4. See also Rainwater, supra note 291, at 149.
298. Rainwater, supra note 291, at 149.
299. Burleson & Huang, supra note 159, at 339.
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and a global opportunity that demands a global response in the
form of integrated polar governance.300
C. More Sophisticated Arctic Council Environmental
Regulation
A detailed clarification of the custom emerging from Article
:98 would better delineate the scope of coastal nations’ regulaL
tory powers over shipping beyond their territorial seas. The Arc-
tic’s “rich and fragile ecosystem” re'uires a clear demarcation of
regulatory jurisdictions to prevent large swathes of the ocean
from seeping through the regulatory cracks.301 A treaty system
would be able to provide comprehensive environmental protec-
tions without necessarily deciding more difficult questions of
sovereignty and jurisdiction. As coastal states did with the ATS,
they could freeze their territorial claims and agree upon envi-
ronmental safeguards while the shipping lanes are still mostly
frozen.302 This would disentangle environmental protections
from jurisdictional and territorial claims and provide a level of
protection for Arctic ecosystems that does not depend on political
vicissitudes.303
In practice, an Arctic treaty regime would have to provide for
regulatory agencies that eSercise each individual nations’ ArtiL
cle 234 powers. Each coastal nation could opt for stronger regu-
lations within its respective EEZ, but a baseline of environmen-
tal protection must be administered by a supranational agency.
A multinational Arctic Council is the obvious choice for such an
agency. The Arctic Council already administers the Arctic Envi-
ronmental Protection Strategy, and treaty provisions that pro-
vided it with binding authority to implement the strategy would
go a long way towards filling conspicuous gaps in the Arctic en-
vironmental regime.304 The Arctic Council should also take on
the responsibility for a Regional Fisheries Management Organ-
ization. Such an organization would be tasked with managing
fish stocks on the high seas that move through one or moremem-
ber states’ EEXK305 Part V of UNCLOS urges the creation of such
300. Id. at 339@40.
301. Watson, supra note 281, at 329@30.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Vanderzwaag et al., supra note 13, at 134.
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inter-EEZ conservation regimes.306 Such systems would be able
to address the transnational reality of fish depletion and craft
balanced and consistent rules to commercial fishing in the Arc-
tic.307
A more vigorous Arctic Council could provide for a stronger set
of environmental regulations and policies in the high North,
while also integrating the voices of the many stakeholders in the
region. Polycentric governance by national, indigenous, and
transnational entities would not do away with the current patch-
work of actors and regulations. Instead, it would move towards
organizing and marshalling those systems around common
goals. This may already be underway, as certain commentators
have looked favorably on the “mosaic” of current polar law.308
Indigenous groups are eager to work with multinational corpo-
rations on profitably eStracting the region’s resourcesK They also
insist on having a stake in the process that reflects their history
in the Arctic.309 A hybrid model of governance, with the Arctic
Council as the premier forum for debate and coordination, would
involve key stakeholders working together to form practical le-
gal mechanisms to resolve resource and shipping disputes and
protect the environment.310 The Arctic Inupiat Offshore LLC, for
instance, joined six Alaskan North Slope indigenous groups with
Shell Oil in order to lay the groundwork for gas and oil explora-
tion.311 Strong indigenous institutions can ensure that those
communities reap the benefits of their natural resources while
306. Hassan, supra note 48, at 519@22. See also UNCLOS, supra note 2, art.
118 (“States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and manage-
ment of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals
exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in the same area,
shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for
the conservation of the living resources concerned. They shall, as appropriate,
cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this
end.”).
307. Jeffers, supra note 14, at 975.
308. Osofsky, et al., supra note 5, at 1431@40.
309. Aqqaluk Lynge has written on the uneasy syncretization of western and
indigenous ideas of property. He has observed, “[w]hile we are uncomfortable
with the word 0own,’ I say it is all Inuit who 0own’ much of the Arctic, if I must
use a non-Inuit word. And through ICC, Inuit will continue to voice this mes-
sage loudly, clearly and collectively.” Osofsky et al., supra note 5, at 1449@50.
310. Id. at 1431@34.
311. Id.
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protecting their environment as well.312 Polar indigeneity em-
phasizes cultural sovereignty over territorial sovereignty and
calls for traditional Westphalian states to cede certain levels of
sovereignty to indigenous entities.313 Placing indigenous groups
in positions of power need not threaten the traditional political
sovereignty of coastal states, but empowering such groups is ab-
solutely necessary to ensure an effective stewardship over the
Arctic. In the words of Aqqaluk Lynge, the chair of the Inuit Cir-
cumpolar Council:
Our organization is not against the exploitation of non-renew-
able resources or industrial development in the circumpolar
Arctic, but find it highly relevant that this development takes
place on sustainable premises where the public is fully in-
formed about the consequences of how industrial, oil and pe-
troleum projects can impact nature, the environment and soci-
ety.314
The inherent problems of crafting regulation in a region as
strange and forbidding as the Arctic demands that regulators
approach industry with an abundance of caution. Prescriptive
regulations will help regulators escape corporate determinations
of what is technically achievable.315 Though bright-line rules can
slow the pace of advancement, such inflexibility can bemitigated
by scientific expertise on the part of regulators.316 Such demand-
ing standard-setting is resource and time intensive. The stake-
holders would also benefit by pooling their resources and bolster-
ing mainstream regulatory regimes, rather than relying exclu-
sively on side-stream systems.317 Circumpolar political collabo-
ration, which would deepen the connections already forged by
312. Id.
313. Jessica M. Shadian, Reimagining Political Space: The Limits of Arctic
Indigenous Self-Determination in International Governance, in GOVERNING
ARCTIC CHANGE: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 43, 40@45 (Kathrin Keil & Sebastian
Knecht eds. 2017).
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the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, is the only solu-
tion to the grave challenges facing the Arctic Ocean in the
twenty-first century.
D. Coordinated Shipping Safety Measures
All states with flagged ships plying the waters of the Arctic
have an interest in creating uniform safety standards in the Arc-
tic.318 OnMay 12, 2011, all Arctic States signed an Arctic Search
and Rescue Agreement to establish responsibilities on the part
of each signatory’s coast guard in case of shipwrecks on the high
seas.319 They should go farther and provide the Arctic Council
with a standard-setting body that can keep abreast of develop-
ments in nautical technology in order to develop, deepen, and
moderniRe the International Maritime 2rganiRation’s Polar
Code, which although state-of-the-art as of 2014, will surely
need more rapid adjustments than other forms of regulation.320
Further, technical bodies organized under the auspices of the
Arctic Council could plug information gaps currently troubling
Arctic shipping. Arctic navigation charts need to be redrawn
with current bathymetric data to respond to opening sea routes;
ice and iceberg formations need to be mapped and charted; and
hydrographic charts need to be redrawn to improve voyage plan-
ning and safe navigation.321
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that as the Arctic ice sheets melt, the region
will experience significant ecological trauma and widespread
habitat loss. Indeed, low-lying countries around the world will
see their coastland disappear as a result of ice sheet melting.
Nevertheless, the international community has a unique oppor-
tunity in these remaining few years or decades before the thaw
to ensure that the Arctic is opened in a responsible manner.
The current legal regimes available under UNCLOS are not
adequate to resolve this issue. There is no firm understanding of
318. AMSA, supra note 84, at 5@8.
319. Rainwater, supra note 291, at 140.
320. Thoren, supra note 71, at 13. See generally Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO],
annex 10, MPEC 68/21/Add. 1, International Code for Ships Operating in Polar
Waters (Polar Code), (Nov. 17@21, 2014), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCen-
tre/HotTopics/polar/Docu-
ments/POLAR%20CODE%20TEXT%20AS%20ADOPTED.pdf.
321. AMSA supra note 84, at 7.
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which shipping lanes are international straits and which are in-
ternal waters or territorial seas. There is also no means of adju-
dicating competing claims to seabed resources under the current
UNCLOS Article 87 rules. Not only are the environmental safe-
guards of Article 234 unevenly applied, but the Arctic Council is
too weak to enforce significant additional regulation. With the
support of the broader international community, the coastal
states that came together on May 28, 2008 ought to do so again
to create an inclusive and resilient framework of Arctic govern-
ance. Polar conflicts are looming, and without a legal infrastruc-
ture to mediate such conflicts, the Arctic and its myriad stake-
holders will be left adrift.
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